




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THE SPANISH PLAGUE THAT NEVER WAS: CRISIS AND EXPLOITATION IN CÁDIZ DURING THE *PESTE* OF PROVENCE

Cindy Ermus

Cádiz est l'Entrepôt de l'Europe et des Indes Espagnols des deux Amériques; c'est le marché commun où se font tous les échanges qui constituent le grand commerce que ces deux parties du globe font entre elles . . . les Indes ne doivent rien recevoir que par l'entremise de Cádiz . . . Cádiz a donc, pour ainsi dire, le privilège exclusif d'approvisionner les Indes de marchandises, mais ce n'est qu'à titre d'étape où règne un flux et reflux perpétuel de marchandises, de denrées, d'or et d'argent, et des fruits qui vont et viennent aux Indes et en Europe.

Cádiz is the hub of Europe, the Spanish Indies and the Americas; it is the common market where all exchanges that constitute the great commerce that these two parts of the world exchange between them are carried out . . . Nothing enters the Indies that does not first pass through Cádiz . . . Cádiz therefore has, as it were, the exclusive privilege of supplying the Indies with goods; it is but a meeting point in the perpetual ebb and flow of goods, commodities, gold, silver, and fruits that come and go between the Indies and Europe.¹

Il est aise de juger que ce Décret a été rédigé dans la veüe de parvenir a la visite de nos batimens, et car il n'y a jamais eu aucune forme n'y manière accoutumée pour visiter les vaisseaux François sur les côtes n'y dans les ports d'Espagne, on s'y est toujours vivement oppose, et on les a maintenu depuis un tems immémorial dans l'exception de cette visite,

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Exemption qui est regardée comme un privilège attache a la Bannière de France, et quien doit être inséparable.

It is plain to see that [the Spanish King's] decree was devised for the purpose of inspecting our vessels, and because there has never been any form or customary way of carrying out the searches of French vessels in the coasts and ports of Spain, we stand strongly opposed to it. Furthermore, we have maintained, from time immemorial, exemptions from such visits—exemptions that are regarded as a privilege inseparable from the banner of France.²

Marseille's history as a port of entry for contagion is well known, as is, to a lesser extent, the story of the last major wave of bubonic plague to strike the city and surrounding areas from 1720 until 1722.³ What is not well known is the impact that this French epidemic, often called the Great Plague of Marseille, had beyond Gallic borders.⁴ In less than two years, the outbreak claimed as many as 45,000 lives in Marseille alone—reportedly about half of the city's population. From Marseille, it spread throughout Provence and neighboring areas, including Gévaudan and Canourgue in Languedoc, Auvergne, le Comtat, Avignon, and the Dauphiné.⁵ For this reason, it is misleading to call it the Great Plague of Marseille or the Marseille Plague. Instead, because the disease entered through Provence, spreading outward from Marseille and growing most virulent in this region, the *Peste* (or Plague) of Provence, as presented in this study, seems most fitting.

All of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and parts of Asia experienced the commercial, economic, and diplomatic effects of this outbreak. Each state responded in different ways for reasons that varied according to the region's recent history and the wider political and commercial context of Europe both prior to and during the outbreak. Commercial interests and diplomatic relationships drove responses to the plague no less than did concerns over public health. Yet, as Geoffrey Parker points out in *Global Crisis*, historians have failed to take climate into account in their studies of the seventeenth-century crisis; similarly, the historiography of eighteenth-century Europe has failed to address the impact of public health crises and other types of disasters on contemporary diplomacy and legislation.⁶ This scarcity is especially pronounced in the scholarship on the first half of the eighteenth century, despite the fact that there were many public health concerns and natural disasters at this time in Europe, its colonies, and other parts of the world. The present study is an attempt to address this theme—to explore the intersection of commerce, diplomacy, and disease in the early eighteenth century by examining the politicization of this particular catastrophe. But rather than discussing what took place in France, it will look at some of the ramifications of the epidemic across the Pyrenees in neighboring Spain, paying special attention to the port of Cádiz—the so-called Gateway to the Indies and one of the eighteenth-century world's most important ports. My analysis of the ramifications of the plague in this major seaport will demonstrate the ways in which the plague in France expressed itself in European diplomacy, commerce, and crisis management beyond French boundaries.

In the 1970s, Mariano Peset, Pilar Mancebo, and José Luis Peset looked at Spanish reactions to the 1720 plague in Provence primarily in the region of Catalonia. Since then, historians such as Armando Alberola Romá, David Barnabé Gil,

Alfonso Zarzoso and others have examined Spanish experiences of (and responses to) both disaster and disease during the “eighteenth century of fevers,” as José Luis Peset has called it, likewise paying special attention to the eastern regions of Valencia and Catalonia.⁷ One of the objectives of the present study is to situate the 1720 plague within this scholarship, looking beyond the eastern territories, and stressing the significance of the *Peste* of Provence as a major moment in the history of disaster management and state formation—one that would in many ways set the precedent for crisis and public health management in Spain for the rest of the eighteenth century and beyond.

State formation and the centralization of disaster management go hand in hand. Upon receiving word of the epidemic in late July 1720, the Spanish court in Madrid quickly used the news as a pretext to impose a commercially debilitating embargo against their French competitors, along with other supervisory controls that complemented King Philip V's centralizing policies. As Antonio García-Baquero González has pointed out, Bourbon reform was concerned not merely with strengthening the absolute monarchy and aggrandizing the state, but also with developing commerce, especially in the ultracompetitive realm of the colonial market.⁸ The development and improvement of the economy became a fundamental aspect of the Bourbon reform program in an era when the so-called Spanish monopoly over the Indies trade had been reduced to little more than an illusion.⁹

Spanish reactions to the French epidemic coincided with an increase in state regulation over all aspects of trade, industry, and society, including health care and crisis management, which previously rested in the hands of local corporations or municipal authorities. Traditionally, the handling of crises in France, Spain, and elsewhere in Europe consisted primarily of the localized implementation of sanitary, preventative, and relief mechanisms, with little or no central supervision or guidance—a product of the more regionalized organization of the European political landscape. By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, however, state monopolization of power had increased, and state interference in previously regional or local matters had expanded and intensified.¹⁰ All over Europe, public health management and emergency response began to stem primarily from the capitals of emerging nation-states. Spanish reactions to the *Peste* of Provence are representative of this larger trend.¹¹

This study will also argue that many working parts of the new centralized system for plague prevention in Spanish ports were born of the plague in Provence, continued well beyond plague years, and resulted in major changes in the handling of public health issues in Spain. To be clear, the infection itself never entered Spain. Strict centralized regulation both in France and abroad successfully prevented it from spreading beyond southeastern France.¹² Yet, effective quarantine efforts could not contain the outbreak's influence.

Consequently, this article will emphasize the importance of applying a transnational approach to the study of disasters, lest we remain blind to the often wide-ranging ramifications that catastrophes like disease epidemics can have in regions far removed from the site of infection. As Elinor Accampo and Jeffrey H. Jackson observe in their introduction for a special issue of *French Historical Studies* on catastrophe, “Disasters . . . reveal how societies operate—who yields

power, how cultural and economic assumptions inform people's reactions, who is perceived as part of the community and thus worthy of rescue or protection, and how and to whom resources are allocated."¹³ I would add that this is not only the case in the epicenter of disaster but also across political and natural boundaries, for "the possibility for disaster is, in many ways, as significant as a disaster itself."¹⁴ A transnational look at the plague of Provence reveals previously hidden connections between commerce, diplomacy, public health, and crisis in this early era of globalization. To contextualize Spanish responses to the *Peste* of Provence, this article will first establish the political backdrop of Europe and the centralizing efforts of Philip V in the years leading up to the arrival of plague (or *peste Levantina*, as some Spaniards called it) from the Levant on the shores of neighboring Provence. Accordingly, before exploring the effects that this far-reaching event had on commercial administration and the management of disease in Spain and the primary European port city of Cádiz, this study will first place the epidemic within the wider framework of post-Utrecht European, especially Franco-Spanish, commerce and diplomacy.

WAR AND THE GALLICIZATION OF THE CARRERA DE INDIAS IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

When plague arrived in France in 1720, Europe was still reeling from two very busy decades of wars, treaties, financial bubbles (those of the South Sea and Mississippi), and commercial, diplomatic, and administrative restructuring. This was especially true in Spain, where a new Bourbon king, Philip V, was trying to find his place both in his new realm and in the wider balance of Europe, which over the previous decades appeared increasingly tipped toward Spain's commercial competitors.¹⁵ Four months prior to the outbreak, in February of 1720, the Treaty of The Hague ended the War of the Quadruple Alliance, which developed when Spain tried to regain by force what it had lost in the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt (1713 and 1714, respectively) that ended the War of the Spanish Succession. Hostilities with the Quadruple Alliance resulted in a humiliating defeat for Philip V, who was obliged to join the Alliance and reconfirm in the treaty of 1720 various privileges and concessions afforded to foreign nations in 1713.¹⁶ As a result, when news of the plague arrived in Madrid, no longer able to take back by military force what it had lost, Spain seized the opportunity to once again "correct" the balance of power in Europe the only way it could—through domestic reforms and commercial leverage. To achieve the latter, the Spanish king would have to put a check on the American contraband trade that was making his competitors rich and reduce foreign participation in the Spanish market, even if it meant violating the terms of various recent treaties.

In the years just preceding the arrival of plague in France, Philip V put forth a serious effort to reform Spain's imperial commerce as he tried to remedy some of Spain's perceived disadvantages in the Indies market. In April 1720, for example, only two months before the outbreak in Provence, Philip V instituted his *Real proyecto para galeones y flotas* [Royal Plan for Fleets and Galleons]. It aimed to increase Spanish products and participation in the market while reducing that of foreigners, and to increase, too, the Crown's control over trade in the Indies. Through this project, King Philip affirmed the importance of establishing

closer and more regular commercial relations between Spain and the Indies, which he believed to be fundamental for stimulating domestic industry, increasing royal revenue, and thus increasing prosperity in the kingdom.¹⁷ The reforms that made up the *proyecto* are significant in that they point to a renewed energy and desire to revitalize Spanish trade, and demonstrate a new Bourbon policy of increased control over Spain's product, its commerce, and consequently, its activity in the ports.¹⁸

Efforts like these, aimed at improving the situation of Spain in the wider context of European power politics and commercial and financial competition, become most evident in the port city of Cádiz—eighteenth-century Spain's most important port and the official capital for the Spanish monopoly over the Indies market. The ancient city of Cádiz, among the oldest continually inhabited cities in Europe, has been active as a commercial port since its founding around 1100 BCE by the Phoenicians, who named it Gadir. For two millennia, Cádiz remained an active seaport, linking North Africa, the Atlantic, and Northern Europe with the Mediterranean. In fact, no other port settlement on the Iberian Peninsula has been so often mapped.¹⁹

As the most active port in Spain throughout most of the eighteenth century, Cádiz serves as a valuable microcosm of Bourbon reforms, especially during the epidemic in Provence when port cities became the focal points of the Crown's preventative measures. In 1717, Cádiz officially became the dynamic epicenter for commercial activity in the Atlantic when the organs responsible for the management of the colonial convoy system called the *Carrera de Indias*, or Route to the Indies, were transferred from the inland river port of Seville.²⁰ From this time until the monopoly began shifting into open commerce around 1765, approximately eighty-five percent of all documented sailings from the Iberian Peninsula to the colonies departed from Cádiz.²¹ Foreigners were technically forbidden from trading directly with the Indies; they instead had to sell their goods to the Spanish who would then sell the foreign merchandise in the Americas. Yet, by the end of the seventeenth century, despite the veil of a Spanish monopoly over commerce in the Americas, non-Spanish merchants actually controlled over three-quarters of all trade activity in Cádiz and the *Carrera de Indias*—all of this in a Spain that fundamentally desired to exclude foreign participation from its imperial commerce. For decades, foreigners had been making their way deeper and deeper into the market by way of concessions and privileges afforded them in a variety of treaties and contracts. And among all groups of foreign merchants in Andalucía—including the Genoese, Anglo-Irish, Danish, Dutch, Portuguese, and others—it was the French who most efficiently managed to breach Spain's commercial defenses and reap the most benefits.²² Indeed, foreign competition gradually eroded Spanish industry, while French industry saw significant gains.

The French dominated the foreign population in Cádiz, such that several historians have referred to the port from the late seventeenth to the eighteenth century as a "French colony."²³ By 1713 the French represented about seventy percent of the foreign population. French merchants also enjoyed a variety of privileges, mostly dating back to the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, that reflected France's new distinction as *nación más favorecida en material comercial* [the most favored nation in commercial matters].²⁴ Among the terms of the treaty were the official establishment of a French consulate in Spain, protection against arbitrary

imprisonment for French merchants and crewmen, the right to compose business documents in French, and, most notably, the highly valued exemption from official visits or inspections of French ships and commercial vessels, reconfirmed on 30 April 1703 in a decree that forbade Spanish officials from boarding French ships, and again in the Treaty of Utrecht.²⁵ In effect, the Treaty of the Pyrenees resulted in what French consul Pierre de Catalan once called a French “liberté de commerce” [freedom of commerce] in Spain.²⁶ Because of it, France held the greater share of all trade that passed through Cádiz, and French goods made up the majority of foreign exports from the Gaditan (Cadizian) port.²⁷ Moreover, as historian Paul Cheney has observed, a considerable amount of the precious metals sent to the Indies on Spanish galleons eventually made its way back to France.²⁸

When the War of Spanish Succession began, the situation further improved for France as Philip V found himself heavily reliant on his Bourbon grandfather, Louis XIV, for weapons, funding, manpower, and guidance in the war effort. At the outbreak of the war, Jean Orry, French financier and *secrétaire du roi* for Louis XIV, and later advisor and finance minister for Philip V, was dispatched to Madrid to report on the state of finances in Spain.²⁹ It soon became very apparent that Spain lacked the resources necessary to carry out any kind of significant military campaign.³⁰ Orry could not help but observe that “there is no prince more poor than the King of Spain.”³¹ And in 1703, in a letter to Michel Chamillart, the French minister of war, the Marquis de Louville wrote from Madrid, “Spain is entirely your responsibility. . . . [It is] without troops, without money, without a navy, in a word lacking in everything that pertains to the defense of a monarchy as extensive as this.”³² Finding himself in an especially favorable position to exploit the commerce of the Spanish Indies, Louis XIV quickly set about breaching the monopoly further. In a letter written to Michel-Jean Amelot, the French ambassador to Spain, Louis XIV wrote, “Le principal objet de la guerre présente est celui du commerce des Indes et des richesses qu’elles produisent” [The principal objective in the present war is the commerce of the Indies and the wealth that it produces].³³ Accordingly, one of his first aims after throwing his support behind his grandson at the start of the succession war was to secure the *asiento de negros*, which he accomplished in 1701.³⁴ Granted to a single state or trading company at a time since the sixteenth century, this exclusive privilege permitted the French to provide Spanish America with slaves and much else besides. Because the *asiento* meant legal access into Spanish colonial markets, the French, like those who held it before and after, would use this privilege to smuggle merchandise of all varieties into the Spanish Americas.³⁵ In addition, near the start of the war in 1704, the French also obtained and exploited an exclusive and very lucrative right of access to the Spanish Pacific around Cape Horn through the Straits of Magellan. This allowed for direct trade with Chile and Peru (with all their Spanish silver) from the ports of Marseille and Saint-Malo.³⁶ This practice had already been taking place since the late seventeenth century, but was now made legitimate through the war years.³⁷

All of these privileges proved extremely lucrative for the French. They facilitated the smuggling of French goods and allowed substantial amounts of bullion to reach France directly. This included, most notably, silver that arrived in Cádiz from the Americas and entered France through its ports, including Marseille. In fact, geographer Patrick O’Flanagan has referred to Cádiz in the eighteenth century

as the “silver city” and the silver capital of Europe, and Marseille was among the principal destinations for silver entering France.³⁸ In a letter to the members of the *Conseil de Marine* [French Marine Council] in 1718, Pierre-Nicolas Partyet, the consul of France in Cádiz (1716–1725), reported that, while returns to France were made difficult because of a recent revocation of the right to extract gold and silver from the Indies (as a result of the escalation of the War of the Quadruple Alliance), two million piasters were still transferred from Cádiz to Marseille, “despite the vigilance of Spanish guards.”³⁹ And the Sardinian intellectual Vicente Bacallar, marquis of San Felipe, commented on French success in Spain when he wrote, “No faltaba en la Francia dinero, y nunca havia havido mas, porque tantos años tenia como libre el Comercio de las Indias, que no lograban otras Naciones” [There is no lack of money in France, and there has never been more, because for so many years they had free reign over the Indies trade, the likes of which no other nation ever managed to achieve].⁴⁰ In 1709 an official French estimate claimed a total of 180 million *livres*’ worth of metal and cargo imported from the New World since 1701.⁴¹ The arrangements that made these French privileges possible made sense during the succession war, for they facilitated the import of American capital to fund the Bourbon war effort.⁴² However, when Philip V began trying to shake the yolk of French influence after the war, seeking to regain a more favorable commercial equilibrium and reduce French involvement in the Spanish Americas, such advantages represented challenges that would have to be overcome by more creative means.⁴³

Since the seventeenth century, despite arguments for French participation in an abating Spanish market, the Gallic encroachment on Spanish transatlantic trade had been generating a great deal of resentment against French merchants. During the War of Spanish Succession, for example, Ambrose Daubenton, French chief agent of commerce and marine in Spain, wrote that “the Spaniards would resolutely prefer to lose the American trade, before consenting to France’s deriving the slightest benefit from it.”⁴⁴ Such anti-French sentiments were expressed most explicitly in Spanish ports both on the peninsula and in the colonies. This was especially the case in Cádiz, where local Spanish merchants came together in the years just preceding the outbreak of plague in France to put an end to the practice of allowing the sons of foreigners, many of whom were of French origins, to trade in the Indies market. Originally, the right to conduct trade with the Spanish Americas belonged to the “*naturales de origen*”—those born in Spain of Castilian, Navarrese, or Aragonese origin. However, a *real cédula* [royal decree] of 14 August 1620 extended this right to the sons of foreigners born in Spain (*genízaros*). Protests against this measure continued well into the eighteenth century, when Spanish merchants in Cádiz complained that extending to *genízaros* the right to conduct trade under the same conditions as the Spaniards led to prejudicial irregularities. They argued that too many foreigners used this provision as a “sinister justification” to obtain trading licenses, which they feared would eventually create a scenario in which profits remained concentrated in foreign populations and their metropolises, leaving Spaniards “dispossessed” of any lucrative involvement.⁴⁵ While tensions had been on the rise for decades, the frequency of protests seems to have peaked between 1717 and May 1720, when Spanish merchants in Cádiz came together to petition the king through the *Consejo de Indias* [Council of the Indies] to allow only the

sons of natural-born Spaniards, and not the sons of foreigners, to conduct trade in the Spanish Indies market.⁴⁶ Upon learning of the petition, the *genízaros* of Cádiz published an appeal in which they established their legitimate right to trade out of Cádiz as natural-born Spaniards. Ultimately, they would maintain their right to trade in the *Carrera de Indias*, but complaints from both sides persisted in the ports. In 1720 Spanish officials reported to the king from the port of Barcelona that the French and their consuls “aqui los franceses y el consul son mirados con odio” [were viewed with the greatest hatred].⁴⁷ Meanwhile, foreign merchants and officials complained about the various injustices committed against them in Spanish ports, more often than not in the port of Cádiz.⁴⁸

REACTIONS TO THE PESTE OF PROVENCE IN SPAIN

It was in this context that news of a deadly outbreak of disease arrived in Madrid in late July 1720, and the administration of Philip V did everything it could to use it to Spanish advantage. Spain acted quickly—more quickly, in fact, than did Paris.⁴⁹ As early as 3 August, a *Real Provisión* (or Royal Order) from the Royal Council of Castile established the first mandatory quarantine for all ships that had passed through Marseille before arriving in Spain.⁵⁰ It also forbade all travel on land of persons who came from the vicinity of Marseille unless they could provide certificates of health (*patentes sanitarios* or *patentes de sanidad*) from their location of origin. This order was followed by various others in August and September that collectively barred commercial relations with all French ports, whether Atlantic or Mediterranean, as well as with Africa and the Levant, the islands of the Mediterranean, including Elba and Menorca (which was now British as a result of the Treaty of Utrecht), Nice, Monaco, Gibraltar (also now British), Portugal, various Italian ports including those of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and parts of Genoa.⁵¹ The restrictions also included any ship bearing a French flag, even if it had not stopped at any port considered a threat. News of these measures was spread throughout all of Spain’s colonies in the Atlantic and Asia.

Vessels traveling directly from uninfected ports, including those of Great Britain and the Austrian Netherlands, could also be turned away, forced into ninety-day quarantines, or required to surrender their goods to be destroyed under the pretext of public health. These reactions may be explained in part by Spain’s losses in the Treaties of Utrecht and The Hague. Concessions under the terms of these treaties included the loss of various territories to the allied enemies of the Bourbons, including the island of Menorca and the ever-contentious territory of Gibraltar, which went to Great Britain; the *Colônia do Sacramento* (in Uruguay), which went to Portugal; and Sicily and parts of the Duchy of Milan, which were transferred to the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II.⁵² The rest of Milan, along with the kingdoms of Naples, Sardinia, and the Spanish Netherlands, went to Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI. Under the terms of both treaties Britain was also granted the highly coveted *asiento de negros* (to the disappointment of the French), as well as the *navío de permiso*, which authorized the English to send one annual vessel to conduct trade in the Spanish Indies. These were all extremely valuable gains for Britain because they enabled the British to participate in decades of lucrative commerce in Spanish America, both legal and illicit, much as France had already been doing for years.

Now, with the threat of plague to justify its actions, the Spanish Crown could shut Gibraltar out of Spanish commerce on the grounds that the British were not effectively enforcing protective quarantines. In doing so it could respond to England's refusal to return Gibraltar, the loss of which was clearly devastating to Spanish morale given the numerous attempts to take it back.⁵³ At this time, too, Spain made use of its influence over Portugal by compelling it to impose restrictions against both French and British ships that wished to enter Spanish and Portuguese harbors. Portugal in turn was obliged to indulge Spain lest they, too, suffer an arbitrary quarantine.⁵⁴ In January 1721, for example, the Spanish newspaper *Gaceta de Madrid* printed news from Lisbon stating that as of 22 December, Portugal had prohibited commerce with France and all Turk and Muslim countries in the Mediterranean.⁵⁵ After all, what was granted by treaty, Spain could yet reject through resistance.

The epidemic in France proved advantageous to Spain in other ways. Although the plague entered the French port at the end of May 1720, Marseillais officials did not officially declare it until August. They had waited as long as they could before acknowledging an epidemic of bubonic plague. Such news they knew would be detrimental to local commerce and relations with the rest of Europe.⁵⁶ Indeed, French restrictions against movements in and around Provence meant that the region was cut off from the world for a time. As a result, when ships could not dock in southern French ports, they would take their merchandise elsewhere, and it was often the Spaniards who benefitted. In a Spanish letter, possibly from the port of Barcelona, one official reported to Madrid: "En el puerto desta ciudad van desembocando muchos navios Ingleses, escoceses, Irlandeses, y Olandeses, cargados de bacallaos, salmones, congrios, y arenques, que como esta cerrado el puerto de Marsella, todo lo que estava destinado para aquel, entre en este" [In the port of this city, many vessels from England, Scotland, Ireland, and Holland have unloaded their cargoes of codfish, salmon, eels, and herring; for since the port of Marseille is closed, everything that was destined to go there, arrives here instead].⁵⁷ The same document goes on to discuss other vessels from Dunkirk loaded with precious wheat destined for Andalucía, "as it is best that the money remain within Spain."⁵⁸

By September 1720 the basic structure of Spain's disease-control policy had taken the shape it would hold for the rest of the eighteenth century. New restrictions required those traveling by land, as well as those on vessels, to carry the *patentes sanitarios* (in French, *patentes de santé*) that precisely documented all their whereabouts, whether they wished to enter Spain or move within it, and whether they had passed through Provence. Anyone travelling without it would have his or her merchandise confiscated and burned. The same was done for the cargoes of suspicious vessels on the coasts. In the ports and lazarets (maritime quarantine stations), new policies brought about the increased presence of the newly established *Policía Sanitaria* [health police], the laying out of *cordones sanitarios* [quarantine lines], the establishment and regulation of lazarets, and the increased regulation of coastal navigation, fisheries, taverns, inns, and markets. Measures also included the prohibition of most nonreligious public events, including the bull run. Violations of new policies were mostly enforced under pain of death, incarceration, or the confiscation of goods.⁵⁹

The tightest controls and most comprehensive system of surveillance were put in place in the eastern regions of Spain, in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia.⁶⁰ These regions not only bordered France and the Mediterranean, but during the War of Succession had also sided with the allied enemies of the Bourbons and recognized Archduke Charles as king when he entered Barcelona in 1705.⁶¹ Philip V saw this as an act of defiance and soon thereafter began crafting the *Nueva Planta* decrees (beginning in 1707) that aimed to consolidate the eastern territories into the Spanish kingdom systematically, replacing their leaders, courts, administration, and languages with those of Castile.⁶² While this did not effectively render the eastern territories bereft of all agency—in fact, despite the aims of the Bourbon monarchy, there remained a great deal of continuity in some aspects of local administration—the centralizing initiatives of Philip V and his ministers did force previously independent municipalities to enter the larger system of Bourbon administration to different degrees, and in many cases, to find new ways to exercise influence.⁶³ Indeed, it was as a result of these reforming endeavors that Philip V was later dubbed “El Rey Animoso,” or “The Energetic King,” a moniker meant to reflect his centralizing efforts within Spain both during and after the War of Spanish Succession.⁶⁴ In these eastern regions, beginning as early as August 1720, soldiers and civilians were chosen to stand on twenty-four-hour watch in order to prevent clandestine vessels from disembarking in unauthorized areas and to supervise the movements and activity of the people.⁶⁵ No festivals or celebrations of any kind were allowed, and several important industries were suppressed, including the raising of pigs, bulls, and steers, as well as the fabrication of silk (due to the foul odors that the raising of silkworms produced), a principal Valencian and Murcian industry in the eighteenth century that remained banned until February 1724, two years after the end of the plague in France.⁶⁶

Among the most notable of the new, kingdom-wide regulations to defend against plague, however, was the creation of Spain’s first centralized Board of Health, the *Junta Suprema de Sanidad*, on 18 September 1720, established at the request of the governor of the Council of Castile, Luis de Miraval (Mirabal) y Espínola.⁶⁷ The council was aware of the challenges involved in the implementation and execution of an empire-wide set of reforms meant to prevent the introduction of contagion in the kingdom. As a result, a centralized board was created that would direct its efforts solely to defense against biological threats, thereby freeing the royal government of this arduous task.⁶⁸ The board was comprised of a governor and four ministers, all members of the Royal Council (none of whom were physicians), and was to report to the king about all matters related to the plague, and later, health and disease more generally.⁶⁹ It was considered a public service, and it represents the first regular, administrative institution to record the history of Spanish health, a task it performed until it was dissolved in 1847.⁷⁰ The extension of the *Junta de Sanidad* at Cádiz was most active, and quickly set about the task of prohibiting maritime commerce with all French ports and much of the Mediterranean. Never before had Spain produced such a comprehensive system for the management of disease.

The new regulations caused a great deal of commotion. In Valencia, for instance, residents rushed in great numbers to obtain health certificates in case they needed to leave the city. Lines formed “from dawn until very late in the evening.”⁷¹

A letter from the Navarrese Valle del Roncal [Roncal Valley] in the Pyrenees complained that the embargo against France, which restricted the area's wool trade, would mean ruin for the people, who would suffer "the nudity, the hunger, the abandonment of their own homes and of their children."⁷² Panic spread elsewhere in Europe, as well, for fear that the plague would spread beyond Provence. In Italy in October 1720, there was at least one episode in which a group of Frenchmen tried to make it ashore in Pisa and were shot and killed in the attempt. The letter from Genoa printed in the *Gaceta de Madrid* reads, "Por las cartas de Pisa se ha sabido, que en los campos vecinos se avian hallado quatro franceses que avian desembarcado en la costa, y aviendoles pedido voletin de sanidad, y no teniendolo, y queriendo entrarle tierra adentro por fuerça, dispararon contra ellos, y aviendolos muerto, quemaron sus cadaveres" [From letters arriving from Pisa we have learned that in the neighboring countryside four Frenchmen were seen who had landed on the coast. A certificate of health was requested of them, but they did not have one, so they attempted to force their way inland, at which point they were shot and killed, and their corpses burned].⁷³ In Murcia, which essentially quarantined itself with mud walls despite lack of infection, there were reports of people scaling the newly built walls or attempting to make breaches in them to escape.⁷⁴ This led to a new set of proclamations that punished such acts with two hundred lashes for a non-noble or four months of *presidio* [garrison and prison] for nobles. Meanwhile, anyone who witnessed the "crime" and failed to alert authorities would be incriminated and charged a fine of twenty ducats' worth of fleece.⁷⁵ In some coastal cities, local authorities applied their own series of measures to complement those of the central government. Alicante, for example, felt markedly the effects that plague-time regulations had on the city's maritime commerce. The population suffered great shortages from which it would not begin to recover until 1722.

HEALTH INSPECTIONS AND THE FONDEO SEARCH IN THE PORT OF CÁDIZ

Another regulation that emerged with particular force at this time proved to be the most controversial. The royal order of 3 August 1720 declared that all vessels arriving from the Mediterranean were subject to mandatory inspections. This might not sound like anything out of the ordinary on the surface, but the inspections of foreign vessels and warehouses—meant not only to prevent disease transfer, but also to preempt illicit commerce, confiscate goods, and extract money from victims—had been a point of contention for decades, particularly for the French, who had the closest commercial ties to Spain and were especially active in Cádiz.

Prior to the 1720 plague, despite the terms of several treaties, Spanish port officials in the peninsula and the colonies conducted inspections of foreign vessels, account books, and warehouses as a measure against illicit commerce. Since the Treaty of the Pyrenees, with the exception of periods during which the terms were set aside, the searches of French cargo were prohibited. However, Franco-Spanish competition and tensions on the ground, especially in Cádiz, meant that these were nonetheless carried out, much to the disappointment of local Frenchmen.

Searches increasingly took one of two forms. During and after the plague, they were mostly executed as *visitas de sanidad* [health visits], during which *pat-*

entes de sanidad were submitted and Spanish port officials inspected the cargo to certify that it was free of infection or risk thereof. These continued until well into the nineteenth century, but they proved to be insufficient for Spanish port officials, who desired more direct control over access to foreign cargoes. As a result, during the plague in Provence, the search of foreign vessels in Spain increasingly took the form of *fondeo* or “right of access” searches. These involved the complete unloading, over a period of two or three days, of a foreign ship’s cargo onto another ship (or ships) for inspection by four officials under the direction of the local governor.⁷⁶ After this rigorous and increasingly expensive inspection, which caused delays lasting anywhere from fifteen to twenty days (a major point of contention for the French), the cargo was either brought ashore by the Spaniards or placed back in the foreign vessel for transport to its final destination.⁷⁷ As a measure to confirm that all cargo was accounted for and that it was free of infection, the *fondeo* sometimes represented the second step in the process of docking at a Spanish port, following twenty-four hours after the initial *visita de sanidad* and the submission to port officials of a detailed account of the ship’s cargo. In addition to carrying a hefty fee, discrepancies between the account and the *fondeo* resulted in confiscations.⁷⁸

These time-consuming inspections not only directly threatened the lucrative practice of illicit commerce, but also carried a mandatory tax that foreign merchants, consuls, and other port officials alike considered a great injustice. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European nations tirelessly sought exemption from official searches of their ships, homes, account books, and warehouses in their dealings with the Spaniards. In fact, even before 1720, Partyet, the French consul in Cádiz, often reminded French officials in his letters of the importance of protecting French privileges in Spain, above all, the exemption from these *visites*. Nevertheless, the inspections continued both on the peninsula and in the Americas, and the outbreak of plague in 1720 served as a solid pretext for carrying them out until long after the end of the epidemic into the nineteenth century. Justifying trade restrictions and sanitary measures on the basis of Franco-Levantine trade relations and the possibility of a new outbreak, officials made the searches compulsory not only when Spain received word of a disease outbreak anywhere in the Mediterranean, but often even in times of health.

The French in Cádiz denounced *fondeo* searches as major violations of merchant rights that served only to facilitate the arbitrary abuse of power “under the pretext of public health,” a ubiquitous phrase in the contemporary record. Believed to exist solely as a means for the Spanish to “little by little destroy [French] exemption from the visits of [their] vessels,” the *fondeo* searches produced endless grievances.⁷⁹ “The *fondeo* is useless . . . based on imagined pretexts,” said one document.⁸⁰ The *fondeos* are expensive and cause “infinite harm,” said another; “they cause considerable delays,” and “they are detrimental to commerce,” said two more.⁸¹ In a letter dated 23 December 1720, Partyet wrote to the French Marine Council in reference to the new regulations, maintaining that French commerce had gone from bad to worse because of the prohibition of French ships in Spain. He wrote, “Many people here believe that this enormous strictness is more the effect of political interest than of an actual fear of contagion.”⁸² Partyet would spend the rest of his life arguing for French merchant rights in Cádiz, defending them against

perceived injustices in the ports, and his son, Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet, would later continue his father's efforts when he took over the consulship.

By 1731 French concerns intensified to such a point that officials called for the establishment of a French chamber of commerce in Cádiz to handle Franco-Spanish commerce, "following the example of the Chamber in Marseille for commerce with the Levant." It would be "under the command and protection of the *Ministre de la marine* [Ministry of the Navy] . . . and consist of the consul and six directors or deputies that would be chosen from among the merchants."⁸³ It was described as "an indispensable necessity [in light of] the Spaniards' infractions against the French."⁸⁴ Among these "infractions" were episodes in which British ships were allowed to bring French products into Spain with the Spanish king's permission. In 1721, for example, French traders living in Cádiz complained when James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormonde, obtained from the king of Spain a passport for two English ships to transport fabrics from Brittany to Cádiz. Reportedly, in June 1721 two English vessels (of 40 and 30 cannons) would transport seven to eight hundred "*paquetons*" of French merchandise to Cádiz and Andalucía. In a letter to the *Conseil de Marine*, Partyet angrily observed, "So it is not French goods that are prohibited here, but the French flag."⁸⁵ A series of additional complaints and controversies, as well as a Franco-Spanish alliance during the War of the Polish Succession, would eventually help to end the practice of *fondeo* temporarily in 1735, but arbitrary quarantines and the *visitas de sanidad* continued, as did the grievances against them.

One of these controversies in particular was effective at bringing attention to the prejudicial practice. On 17 June 1729, Alexandre Coterel (or Cotterel), captain of the merchant ship *Le Prudent*, departed his base in St. Malo for Martinique and arrived at the port of Cádiz on 20 June 1730 packed with sugar. At this time, Coterel was obliged to submit to *fondeo*, at which point 160 barrels of sugar were taken from his ship. Two Spanish boats had been charged with the responsibility of holding the French ship's cargo for the *fondeo*, but these two ships were then intercepted, their men detained, and their valuable Martiniquais contents confiscated. This was done at the behest of the governor of Cádiz, Antonio Álvarez de Bohorqués, along with the director of customs, who wished to seize the cargo by carrying out what local French officials considered an obvious scheme to steal from the French.⁸⁶ The governor is said to have accused Captain Coterel of attempting to introduce the sugar as contraband in Cádiz, which the French consul in Cádiz at the time, Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet (son of Pierre-Nicolas Partyet), argued was "as impossible as it is unheard of." Partyet described "*L'affaire Coterel*" [the Coterel Affair] as "the greatest injustice that there has ever been."⁸⁷ Though this may be a bit of an exaggeration, the entire episode, including the proceedings, the loss of goods to weather damage, and the accruing interest, may have cost as much as one thousand *pistolles* of gold, as well as the reputation of local Gaditan officials.

Jean-Baptiste Partyet informed Daubenton of the affair and made sure that news made it to José Patiño, minister of Philip V, in hopes that such abuses would cease and those responsible for them would be punished.⁸⁸ In a letter to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, comte de Maurepas, he wrote, "It is hoped, for the welfare and tranquility of trade in general, that Monsieur Daubenton can see to it, together with Monseigneur, that this administrator, who is the cause of all these

vexations, is dismissed.”⁸⁹ Phélypeaux, secretary of state for the marine in France, responded that as a result of this most recent offense, the Spanish king must order the suppression of the practice of *fondeo* “as soon as possible.” “It is true,” he wrote, “that it is important to immediately abolish the practice of *fondeo*. It stands entirely contrary to established rules, as well as to all that has been stipulated in past treaties. So long as the practice persists, it will continue to cause various new disorders and many prejudices in our commerce with Spain.”⁹⁰

Earlier, on 30 July, Daubenton received orders from Patiño ordering that Coterel’s trial be transferred from local jurisdiction to the *Consejo Supremo de Hacienda* [Council of Finance]. The same letter also gave orders to return to Coterel the 160 barrels of sugar that were confiscated from *Le Prudent* during the *fondeo*.⁹¹ A few days later, Partyet reported back to Phélypeaux that his continuing efforts to end the unjust measure of *fondeo*, especially after the Coterel Affair, had seen little to no progress, but that the barrels of sugar were indeed finally returned to Captain Coterel on 8 August. Soon thereafter, his case proceeded to the *Consejo de Hacienda* where it would be completed.⁹²

Despite the fact that the captain won his case in September and was to be cleared of any false charges brought against him, the last we learn of *l’Affaire Coterel* is that by November the case was still pending because of the absence of the consignee of Coterel’s vessel. This was possibly a witness in the case who hastily departed Cádiz to escape the outbreak of yellow fever that had arrived in the port weeks earlier.⁹³ Consequently, delays and excuses continually deferred the suppression of *fondeo*, much to the displeasure of the French and other foreigners in Cádiz. One French contemporary complained, “Being that there is no legitimate reason, nor basis for conducting the *fondeo*, it is of great importance to make known to his Catholic Majesty and his ministers that they must end the harassment that is as bothersome as it is costly for our trade.”⁹⁴

The short-lived Coterel Affair highlighted the perceived injustices of *fondeo* and contributed to the temporary ending of the practice for a short time in August 1735. On 12 September, Paul Caullet, the chancellor of the consulate of France in Cádiz, informed Phélypeaux that on 5 September the royal order from the Court of Spain calling for the suppression of *fondeo* had finally arrived in Cádiz.⁹⁵ Letters from Caullet and Partyet in November and December, respectively, happily report the complete discontinuation of *fondeo* searches in Cádiz, but complaints against the *visitas de sanidad* persisted.⁹⁶ Alas, Spain had managed to maintain a loophole.

Not long after its temporary cessation in 1735, however, the practice of *fondeo* was reinstated. It is unclear exactly when it officially became standard practice again, but we can speculate that it was sometime around 1742 or 1743—two very busy plague years in Europe. Plague outbreaks in Europe and the Mediterranean between 1742 and 1744 alarmed European authorities, and may have put back into motion regulations originally imposed during the Plague of Provence. Even into the nineteenth century, when yellow fever outbreaks terrorized the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas, *fondeo* searches continued to be mentioned in printed publications.⁹⁷ Because the 1720 plague did, after all, remain confined to Provence, Spain would argue that contemporary plague-prevention policies were successful and must be reinstated time and time again.

THE CENTRALIZATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN DURING THE PLAGUE OF PROVENCE

Progressively throughout the *Peste* of Provence, we see Spanish authorities' rigid intervention in trade and commercial navigation. Rather than allowing French merchants to enjoy such prearranged freedoms as the exemption from cargo searches, open access to Spanish ports, and lower duties, Spanish officials now used the plague as a pretext to arbitrarily inspect vessels and account books, confiscate merchandise, and demand payments. Despite protection against them in the terms of various treaties, these searches increased exponentially during and after the plague in France, and became the principal cause for complaint for foreign merchants and consuls in Spain following the Plague of Provence.

There was nothing new about the suspension or restriction of trade with infected regions during plague epidemics, nor does the 1720 plague represent the first time that sanitary measures had been used to deliberately ruin another's commerce. In fact, by the eighteenth century, embargoes and quarantines were seldom imposed "solely for reasons of public health." As historian Mark Harrison has observed, "The question of whether to impose quarantine was a political as much as a medical one."⁹⁸ What is extraordinary about this particular case, however, is that the severity and extent of the controls put in place, and the degree to which they were managed from the capital, had little precedent in Spanish history and were unmatched elsewhere in Europe at this time, except in France itself. Even in parts of Italy, where trade embargoes were placed against southern France as early as August 1720, domestic measures to prevent plague did not come close to equaling those in Spain. Moreover, restrictive measures in Spain and the colonies remained in place until well after the plague. The last significant relapse of the epidemic took place in Marseille in February 1722, after which it began to subside for good. About a year later, *Te Deums* (hymns of praise) in Paris and Rome marked the recognition that the scourge was over.⁹⁹ European cities such as Turin began lifting their trade restrictions with France as early as 1722, while others, like Genoa, waited until 1723 before allowing products from Marseille to flow into their ports.¹⁰⁰ Spain, however, would not lift all restrictions against France until 28 March 1724—two years after the plague disappeared—and then the resumption of commerce between the two countries was slow and problematic, due in part to the preventive policies that remained in place long after the epidemic had vanished, including, most notably, the detested *fondeo* searches. Despite continuity in terms of the measures themselves, a look at disease management in Spain prior to the *Peste* of Provence demonstrates that the measures enacted in 1720 were significantly more centralized and extensive than those put in place during seventeenth-century epidemics. This is especially so if we consider that this particular outbreak never even made it into Spain, and that most measures remained in place long after the end of the epidemic had been declared both in France and abroad.

At the time of the Provençal plague, Spain had not suffered a major disease epidemic since the mid-seventeenth century. In June 1647 plague entered the Iberian Peninsula through Valencia and eventually spread into Seville in Andalucía, where it became most virulent and raged until 1652.¹⁰¹ Historian Antonio Domínguez Ortiz has called this "the greatest demographic catastrophe to have befallen Spain

in modern times.”¹⁰² Unlike earlier plague outbreaks of the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, the 1647 outbreak devastated Andalucía with such persistence and intensity that its socioeconomic effects would linger for many years.¹⁰³ Domínguez Ortiz puts the number of deaths within the city of Seville alone at no less than 60,000 souls, a toll caused in large part by a lack of preventative measures.¹⁰⁴ And yet, despite the virulence of this epidemic and the importance of the highly populated city of Seville as the rich hub of Spain’s monopoly over the Indies market at that time, the permanent institution of a centralized *Junta de Sanidad* in Madrid did not take place until 1720 when Spain learned of the epidemic in Provence. During the seventeenth century there did exist local *Juntas de Salud* or boards of health, put in place at a municipal level in some of the most important ports on the Peninsula, but because of their local and often provisional nature, these were powerless in the face of major outbreaks like that of Seville.¹⁰⁵ They lacked, for example, an efficient system of communication such as the *Junta* of 1720 established, a defect that some considered to be one of the principal difficulties that authorities faced in 1647.¹⁰⁶ In Barcelona, too, where the elements that would represent the city’s public health legislation were implemented between 1460 and 1530, the epidemic of 1647 presented a challenge for the *Consell de Cent* [Council of One Hundred], the local governing body that would later be abolished by Philip V under the *Decretos de Nueva Planta*.¹⁰⁷ Unable to prevent the infection from entering Barcelona, the *Consell de Cent* was primarily responsible for managing the crisis and preventing its spread, which proved an impossible task. As a result, many were compelled to flee the city, including members of the local government, which in turn lessened support for public authority and thus aggravated an already critical situation.¹⁰⁸

Along with the practice of prayers and processions meant to ward off divine ire, disease control by the mid-seventeenth century in Spain consisted of defensive measures that aimed to restrict the movements of peoples or products. For example, local authorities could employ quarantine lines that essentially cordoned off infected areas to prevent the spread of disease, or they could implement measures to restrict the movements of people trying to enter or exit city centers. In these cases, the traveler would be obliged to provide a permit, or *cédula*, obtained from the municipal *Cabildo* in order to pass city walls. In plague times local festivals were often suspended, and local and central authorities commonly issued trade restrictions that limited and monitored the entrance into Spain of any persons or materials coming from an infected port. This happened, for example, when news arrived in Spain that there was plague in Holland in 1663 and then in London from 1665 to 1666. Madrid prohibited any commercial dealings with ports of either country, though prohibitions were lifted soon thereafter.¹⁰⁹ However, communication networks and plague prevention measures through the seventeenth century were much more fragmented in nature than were the methods employed in 1720, when Spain was not only struggling to maintain a position of influence in the commercial and diplomatic milieu of Europe, but also working to reform and consolidate Spain from within. In the earlier period, municipal and regional governments, rather than a more centralized state, were primarily responsible for preventing and managing crises that were at times too large for the capacities of smaller, local government.

The epidemic of 1720 to 1722 represented a break with the past, marked in part by a more involved central government and an augmented system of communication between the Crown and city officials that represents an early example of the more modern, comprehensive, state-centralized disaster response systems that we see all over the globe today. While historians like Françoise Hildesheimer have recognized the amplified involvement of the central government in handling the 1720 epidemic, they have underplayed its significance to modern-day systems of disaster response.¹¹⁰ Increasingly over the last two centuries, national governments, along with centralized global organizations like the World Health Organization and the United Nations, have emerged as the dominant forces behind crisis management. There has been a growing belief in a social contract of sorts in which disaster victims have “a democratic right to aid and recovery resources as members and citizens of a sovereign nation-state,” as sociologist Kevin Gotham has phrased it.¹¹¹ This shift coincided with the rise of state power and the gradual development of modern nation-states, and the cementing of the monarchical states of France and French-influenced Spain in the seventeenth to early eighteenth century. Responses to the plague in Provence at this time demonstrate an increase in the monopolization of power and the expansion and intensification of state interference in previously regional or local matters, not only in Spain, but in other parts of Europe as well.

CONCLUSION

The Plague of Provence and the Great European Plague Scare that ensued allowed the Spanish Crown the opportunity to impose a variety of measures meant to complement administrative centralization and control, and to attempt to regain the commercial footing that it had lost over the last several decades, all under the veil of plague prevention. These efforts ultimately failed, since the Spanish Crown could not effectively subdue foreign dominance over the Indies trade; indeed, France’s involvement in the Indies market both through Cádiz and through its own increasing presence in the Atlantic only intensified during the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, working parts of the new centralized system for plague prevention in Spain were born of the plague in Provence and continued well into the nineteenth century, resulting in major changes in the management of both public health and customs inspections. Among these changes were the *Junta de Sanidad*, the increasing use of lazarets, the health patent policy, the highly contested *visitas de sanidad* and *fondeo* searches, and the use of arbitrary extended quarantines. At this time, too, all of Spain saw a significant increase in communication between the Crown and administrators in the provinces, especially along the borders and in the ports.¹¹² Customs inspections and the public health system emerged more centralized and bureaucratized. The rise of state power increasingly offered countries like Spain the ability to respond to the threat or impact of epidemics and disasters in ways that complemented the fundamental interests of the state. Accordingly, the administration of Philip V was capable of launching a centralized system of laws, royal decrees, and provisions during the French plague, the likes of which had never been known in Spain, all as a result of the Spanish plague epidemic that never was.¹¹³

The 1720 plague was not an isolated incident that only affected France. Rather, it was a complex, transnational and transregional diplomatic and commercial event with ramifications that extended beyond France and beyond 1722,

despite the fact that it never actually spread beyond Gallic borders. Historians including Ted Steinberg, Jonathan Bergman, Matthew Mulcahy, Elinor Accampo, and Jeffrey Jackson, among others, have appreciated that disasters can reveal a great deal about the societies in which they take place.¹⁴ The present study has demonstrated that they can be just as revealing about the social and political dynamics of regions far removed from the epicenter of calamity. Although the history of disasters—whether man-made or natural, and including epidemics—has typically been written with national blinders, a simple scroll through any news site today will remind us that volcanic ash from Iceland can ground flights around the globe, that a major hurricane can initiate a diaspora of New Orleanians, and that an earthquake in Japan can alter global perceptions of nuclear power. Far from representing localized incidents that have little or no bearing anywhere else, disasters can have ramifications that transcend national, regional, and even temporal boundaries. Broader explorations of historical disasters will help shed light on the complexity of managing crisis and disease in today's rapidly globalizing world.

NOTES

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1. "Essay sur les diverses Branches du commerce que la France fait a Cadiz, et sur le moyens généraux des les y augmenter," 26 February 1762, Affaires étrangères [henceforth cited as AE], BIII, 342, Les Archives nationales de France [henceforth cited as AN]. All translations are the author's except where otherwise noted.

2. Pierre-Nicolas Partyet, "[Rapport] du commerce de France en Espagne où on prétend visiter nos batimens sur pretexte de la santé," 4 July 1723, AE, BIII, 361, AN.

3. The Plague of Provence was the last major epidemic of plague within France, but it was by no means the last occurrence of plague in Europe. Major outbreaks in the western Mediterranean in the early 1740s, including that of Messina in 1743, would leave scores of thousands dead within months.

4. Some contemporary evidence suggests that there were also cases of pneumonic plague during the 1720 epidemic. All three forms of plague (bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic) are caused by the bacillus *Yersinia pestis*, a bacterium discovered by Alexandre Yersin in 1894, and communicated from rodents to humans through the bites of infected fleas. Please note that the author will use "epidemic" and "outbreak," as well as "peste" and "plague" interchangeably throughout this article.

5. The figures vary a great deal. There were between 76,000 and 126,000 deaths in all of southern France. Many books have been published, all in French, on how the Plague of Provence was experienced in other parts of southeastern France, among them: Henri Dubled, "Les épidémies à Avignon et dans le Comtat Venaissin," *Provence historique* (Jan.–Mar. 1969); L. Duhamel, *Les grandes épidémies à Avignon et dans le Comtat* (Annuaire de Vaucluse, 1885); Paul Gaffarel and Marquis de Duranty, *La peste de 1720 à Marseille et en France* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1911); Sylvain Gagniere, *Les épidémies de peste et leurs souvenirs dans la région vaclusienne* (Avignon: Imprimerie Rullière, 1941); Danièle Larcena, et al., *La Muraille de la peste* (Vaucluse: Les Alpes de Lumière, 1993). Others have discussed the "Great Plague of Marseille" within the wider scope of their diverse studies. These include Jean-Noël Biraben, *Les hommes et la peste en France et dans les pays européens et méditerranéens, tomes I & II* (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1975); William McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976); Françoise Hildesheimer, *Le Bureau de la santé de Marseille sous l'ancien régime* (Marseille: Fédération historique de Provence, 1980); Daniel Panzac, *Quarantaines et lazarets: l'Europe et la peste d'Orient, XVII^e–XX^e siècles* (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1986); Françoise Hildesheimer, *La terreur et la pitié: L'Ancien Régime à l'épreuve de la peste* (Paris: Éditions Publisud, 1990); Giuseppe Restifo, *Le ultime piaghe: le pesti nel mediterraneo, 1720–1820* (Milano: Selene Edizioni, 1994); Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones, *The Medical World of Early Modern France* (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1997); Mark Harrison, *Contagion: How Commerce has Spread Disease* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2013). Those who offer the 1720 plague a more central place in their studies include: Charles Carrière, Marcel Courduré, and Ferréol Rebuffat, *Marseille ville morte: la peste de 1720* (Marseille: M. Garçon, 1968); Jean-Noël Biraben, "Certain Demographic Characteristics of the Plague Epidemic in France, 1720–22," *Daedalus* 97, no. 2, Historical Population Studies (Spring 1968): 536–45; Gérard Fabre, "La Peste en l'absence de Dieu? Images votives et représentations du mal lors de la peste provençale de 1720," *Archives de sciences sociales des religions*, 36e Année, no. 73, Anthropologie Urbaine Religieuse (Jan.–Mar. 1991): 141–58; Colin Jones, "Plague and Its Metaphors in Early Modern France," *Representations* 53 (Winter 1996): 97–127; Daniel Gordon, "The City and the Plague in the Age of Enlightenment," *Yale French Studies* 92 (1997): 67–87; Daniel Gordon, "Confrontations with the Plague in Eighteenth-Century France," in *Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Alessa Johns (New York: Routledge, 1999), 3–29; Junko Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce: Marseille and the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2011).

6. Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2013).

7. See, for instance, Mariano Peset Reig, María Pilar Mancebo Alonso, "Valencia y la peste de Marsella de 1720," *Primer Congreso de Historia del País Valenciano: celebrado en Valencia del 14 al 18 de abril de 1971* (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1973), 3:567–78; Mariano Peset and José L. Peset, *Muerte en España: Política y sociedad entre la peste y el colera* (Madrid: Seminarios y Ediciones, 1976); Armando Alberola Romá, "Una enfermedad de carácter endémico en el Alicante del XVIII: Las fiebres tercianas," *Revista de historia moderna: Anales de la Universidad de Alicante* 5 (1985): 127–40; Armando Alberola Romá and David Bernabé Gil, "Tercianas y calenturas en tierras meridionales valencianas: Una aproximación a la realidad médica y social del siglo XVIII," *Revista de historia moderna* 17 (1998–99): 95–112. Alfonso Zarzoso, "¿Obligación moral o responsabilidad política?: Las autoridades Borbónicas en tiempo de epidemias en la Cataluña del siglo XVIII," *Revista de historia moderna* 17 (1998–99): 73–94; Enrique Perdiguer Gil, "Con medios humanos y divinos": La lucha contra la enfermedad y la muerte en Alicante en el siglo XVIII," *Dynamis: Acta Hispanica ad Medicinam Scientiarumque Historiam Illustrandam* 22 (2002): 121–50; Armando Alberola Romá, "Riadas, inundaciones y desastres en el sur Valenciano a finales del siglo XVIII," *Papeles de geografía* 51–52 (2010): 23–32. On the experience of death in the borderlands of the Pyrenees, see also Raymond Sala, *Le Visage de la mort dans les Pyrénées catalanes: Sensibilités et mentalités religieuses en Haut-Vallespir, XVII^e, XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles* (Paris: Economica, 1991). For a historiography of the subject of plague in Spain as of 1994, see José Luis Betrán Moya, "La peste como problema historiográfico," *Manuscrits: Revista d'història moderna*, no. 12 (1994): 283–319.

8. Antonio García-Baquero González, "El comercio colonial en la época de Felipe V: El reformismo continuista," in *Felipe V y su tiempo: congreso internacional*, vol. 1, ed. Eliseo Serrano Martín (Zaragoza: Institución "Fernando el Católico," 2004): 75–76.

9. *Ibid.*, 76, 78.

10. See Cindy Ermus, "The Plague of Provence: Early Advances in the Centralization of Crisis Management," *Arcadia: Environment & Society Portal*, no. 9 (2015), accessed 2 August 2015, <http://www.environmentandsociety.org/arcadia/plague-provence-early-advances-centralization-crisis-management>.

11. This article forms part of a larger study, a global history of the Provençal plague, that explores its ramifications in port cities including Cádiz, London, Lisbon, Genoa, and some of the colonial centers with which these ports were most closely associated, both in the Americas and in Asia.

12. In Marseille, early municipal responses (or lack thereof) failed to prevent the infection from spreading outward into Provence. One of those responsible was Jean-Baptiste Estelle, Marseille's *premier échevin* [chief municipal magistrate], who had used his influence to arrange for the premature unloading of his cargo of infected silks and bales of cotton into the city's warehouses in order to sell them at the upcoming *Foire de Beaucaire*. As a result, the administration in Paris, where the Regent Philippe d'Orléans had moved in 1715, deployed military commanders, bestowed absolute authority upon municipal officials, and imposed martial law—and their efforts were ultimately a success.

13. Elinor Accampo and Jeffrey H. Jackson, "Introduction," *French Historical Studies* 36, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 165.

14. *Ibid.*, 171.

15. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the era of Philip V: Antonio de Béthencourt Massieu, ed., *Felipe V y el Atlántico: III centenario del advenimiento de los Borbones* (Gran Canaria: Ediciones del Cabildo de Gran Canaria, 2002); Ricardo García Cárcel, *Felipe V y los españoles: Una visión periférica del problema de España* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, 2002); Agustín González Enciso, *Felipe V: La renovación de España: Sociedad y economía en el reinado del primer Borbón* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2003); Eliseo Serrano Martín, ed., *Felipe V y su tiempo: congreso internacional*, vol. 1 (Zaragoza: Institución “Fernando el Católico,” 2004); Allan J. Kuethe, “La política colonial de Felipe V y el proyecto de 1720,” *Orbis incognitus: avisos y legajos del Nuevo Mundo* (Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2007), 1:233–41; Catherine Désos, *Les Français de Philippe V: Un modèle nouveau pour gouverner l’Espagne, 1700–1724* (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2009); Pablo Vázquez Gestal, *Una nueva majestad: Felipe V, Isabel de Farnesio y la identidad de la monarquía (1700–1729)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2013).

16. In fact, disputes arising from privileges and other matters of commerce would define the limits of Anglo-Franco-Spanish cohesion and trust for the duration of Philip V’s reign. Désos, *Les Français de Philippe V*, 261. For more on post-Utrecht diplomacy and reform, see Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, *The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713–1796* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014).

17. Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1979), 108. According to historian Agustín González Enciso, “the reign of Philip V saw the strengthening of central administration, the optimization of the army and navy, and the implementation of highly interventionist politics in various aspects of the economy, above all that of industry.” Agustín González Enciso, “La industria en el reinado de Felipe V,” in *Felipe V y su tiempo: congreso internacional*, ed. Eliseo Serrano Martín (Zaragoza: Institución “Fernando el Católico,” 2004), 1:57. See also Jesús Pradells Nadal, *Del foralismo al centralismo: Alicante 1700–1725* (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1984), 130. Kuethe and Andrien, *Spanish Atlantic World*, 7.

18. The best method for achieving increased contact with the Indies was the frequent and regular dispatching of the galleons and fleets. The fleets typically left from Seville, and after 1717, from Cádiz. When they arrived in the Caribbean, they split up into the *flota* [smaller ships] that continued to Mexico, while the *galeones* [larger ships] went on to Portobello or Cartagena. The *Real proyecto* also included measures to prevent delays and prolonged stays, which too often had detrimental effects on the ships, crews, and cargoes. Moreover, in order to support Spanish shipyards under the terms of the *proyecto*, only Spanish-built vessels were to be admitted in fleets (except in special circumstances), and taxes on certain goods, such as Spanish produce, were now eighty-five percent less than they had been under a previous decree of 1711. Dues for the exporting merchant were also cut, so as to promote Spanish exports by conducting trade with Spanish goods and produce. For more on the *Real Proyecto*, see García-Baquero González, “El comercio colonial,” 75–102.

19. Its Phoenician founding may make it Europe’s oldest Atlantic port city. Patrick O’Flanagan, *Port Cities of Atlantic Iberia, c. 1500–1900* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 82, 83.

20. These organs were the *Casa de la Contratación* [House of Trade] and the *Consulado de cargadores a Indias* [Council of Shippers to the Indies—essentially the merchant guild]. See Ana Crespo Solana, *La Casa de Contratación y la Intendencia General de la Marina en Cádiz, 1717–1730* (Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1996); Ana Crespo Solana, “El Comercio y la armada de la monarquía: La Casa de Contratación y la Intendencia General de la Marina de Cádiz, 1717–1750,” *Jornadas de Historia Marítima* 24, no. 39 (2001): 63–78.

21. O’Flanagan, *Port Cities*, 86–87. Carla Rahn Phillips, “The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires, 1450–1740,” in *Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 34–101, 96. The monopoly was finally abolished in 1786.

22. Interestingly, however, the Dutch reaped the benefits of increased trade in Spanish markets after 1720 when Spain launched plague-time regulations that isolated the French and the British. For more on Dutch maritime commerce with and in Cádiz in particular, see the work of Ana Crespo Solana, including *El Comercio marítimo entre Amsterdam y Cádiz, 1713–1778* (Madrid: Banco de España, Servicio de Estudios, 2000); and “Merchants and Observers: The Dutch Republic’s Commercial Inter-

ests in Spain and the Merchant Community in Cádiz in the Eighteenth Century,” *Dieciocho: Hispanic Enlightenment* 32, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 193–224.

23. Among them are Henry Kamen, Albert Girard, Didier Ozanam, Manuel Bustos Rodríguez, Olivier Le Goüic, Antonio García-Baquero González, Pedro Collado Villalta, and Henri Sée.

24. Albert Girard, *El comercio francés en Sevilla y Cádiz en tiempo de los Habsburgo* (Seville: Editorial Renacimiento, 2006), 235–36; Gaston Rambert, “La France et la politique commerciale de l’Espagne au XVIII^e siècle,” *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine* 6, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec., 1959): 271; Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700–15* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1969), 160. The Treaty of the Pyrenees was modeled in part after earlier treaties between Spain and England and the Hanseatic League.

25. Rambert, “La France et la politique commerciale,” 271; Kamen, *War of Succession*, 156–58.

26. Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2003), 64–65. The French also enjoyed limits on commercial duties for their largest imports as a result of late seventeenth-century arrangements called the *Convenios de Eminente* [Eminente’s contracts], named after the customs director in Cádiz, Francisco Báez Eminente. Imports of the cheaper and lower-quality Silesian linens, for example, remained dutied at twelve percent, while the better-quality French linens paid only two to five percent. The *Convenios* [agreements or contracts] worked like an unpublicized treaty system that extended to the French, Dutch, and English who traded through Cádiz beginning with the earliest of these in 1668. To the French importers in Andalucía, the privilege of the *Convenios* was considered “the foundation of their trade in Spain, without which they could not survive.” Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, 70.

27. *Ibid.*, 20. Kuethé and Andrien, *Spanish Atlantic World*, 66. Historian Paul Cheney has estimated that by the late seventeenth century, France handled thirty-nine percent of the commerce that filtered through the port city, compared with seventeen percent for Genoa, fourteen percent for England, and twelve percent for the United Provinces. French materials made up seventy-five percent of the fabric that crossed the Atlantic, stimulating industry in the regions of Brittany, Normandy, and Lyon. France also supplied the New World with profitable quantities of materials including paper, books, beaver hats, and lace. Paul Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2010), 26, 27.

28. Cheney remarks: “One estimate puts yearly averages in 1670 at twelve million l.t. [*livres tournois*] worth of gold and silver, and another, from France’s diplomatic corps in 1686, puts these returns at thirteen to fourteen million.” Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce*, 27. For an exhaustive study on the flow of gold and silver from the Americas into Europe, as well as French participation in illicit trade through the port of Cádiz, see the relevant parts of chapters three and four in Michel Morineau, *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux: Les retours des trésors américains d’après les gazettes hollandaises, XVI^e–XVIII^e siècles* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985).

29. Orry’s influence played a major role in the financial and administrative restructuring that took place under Philip V’s centralizing Bourbon reforms. For more on his contributions, see Anne Dubet, *Jean Orry et la réforme du gouvernement de l’Espagne (1701–1706)* (Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise-Pascal, 2009), 15. Various studies, including those of Henry Kamen and Geoffrey J. Walker, discuss French influence on Bourbon reforms under Philip V. See also: José Miguel López García, “Sobrevivir en la corte: Las condiciones de vida del pueblo llano en el Madrid de Felipe V,” in *Felipe V y su tiempo: congreso internacional*, ed. Eliseo Serrano Martín (Zaragoza: Institución “Fernando el Católico,” 2004), 1:133–66.

30. For more on financing the War of Spanish Succession, see Concepción de Castro, “Le Conseil et les premiers ministres des Finances sous Philippe V: conflits et intégration (XVIII^e siècle),” in *Les finances royales dans la monarchie espagnole, XVI^e–XIX^e siècles*, ed. Anne Dubet (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2008), 89–102; Guillaume Hanotin, *Jean Orry: Un homme des finances royales entre France et Espagne, 1701–1705* (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2009); Anne Dubet, *Jean Orry et la réforme du gouvernement de l’Espagne (1701–1706)* (Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise-Pascal, 2009); Guy Rowlands, *The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence, and Money in Louis XIV’s France* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).

31. Quoted in Hanotin, *Jean Orry*, 65.

32. Letter from Marquis de Louville to Michel Chamillart in Madrid, 23 August 1703, as quoted and translated in Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 442. See Philippe de Rouvroy, duc de Saint-Simon, *Mémoires XI*, ed. A. de Boislisle (Paris: Hachette et cie, 1895), 531. Chamillart was the minister of war for Louis XIV from 1699 until he fell out of pleasure in 1709. Charles-Auguste d'Allonville, marquis de Louville was head of the king's household, or *Chef de la Maison*, for Philip V from 1700 to 1703.

33. Letter from Louis XIV to Michel-Jean Amelot, marquis de Gournay on 18 February 1708 in M. le baron de Girardot, ed., *Correspondance de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot, son Ambassadeur en Espagne, 1705–1709*, vol. 2 (Nantes: Imprimerie Merson, 1864), 121.

34. García-Baquero González, “El comercio colonial,” 83.

35. Phillips, “Growth and Composition of Trade,” 95. The Portuguese and the Dutch held the *asiento* before the French in 1701. In 1713, under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, it would be passed to the British. For more on French, Spanish, British, and Dutch interest in the Spanish Pacific at this time, see chapter four in Paul W. Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713–1763* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2011).

36. Wim Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600–1800,” in *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500–1830*, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009), 164.

37. After 1714 the French would cease their trade in these ports—a stipulation vigorously pursued by the British and Dutch after Utrecht—but the practice continued illegally, even after 1718 when Spain sent out an expedition to enforce the law and suppress French traffic in the Pacific. Madrid saw in the plague an opportunity to help control illicit French traffic in the Indies. Royal proclamations were regularly sent to the colonies that very strictly prohibited the docking of any French vessels at a Spanish port, even if the ships had not stopped in or near Provence.

38. O’Flanagan, *Port Cities*, 86. Myriame Morel-Deledalle and Claude Badet, “Marseille aux XVIIe & XVIIIe siècles,” in *Vivre en quarantaine dans les ports de Marseille aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, ed. Myriame Morel-Deladalle (Marseille: Musée d’Histoire de Marseille, 1987), 9–15, 12.

39. Pierre Nicolas Partyet, consul de France à Cadix, aux membres du Conseil de Marine, 24 Octobre 1718, AE, BI, 224, ff. 392–94v, AN.

40. Vicente Bacallar, marqués de San Felipe, *Comentarios de la Guerra de España, e Historia de su Rey Phelipe V El Animoso, desde el principio de su Reynado, hasta la Paz General del año 1725*, tomo I (Genoa: Matheo Garvizza, 1725), 308.

41. Rowlands, *Financial Decline*, 94.

42. David R. Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish Miracle,” 1700–1900* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), 99.

43. In 1718 Spain dispatched a naval squadron to the Peruvian coast to seize several interloping French merchantmen. Ringrose notes that “direct French trade with Peru never recovered and French merchants were forced to settle for access to that market through legal channels in Cádiz.” Ringrose, *Spanish Miracle*, 100.

44. Ambrose Daubenton de Villebois, French chief agent of commerce and marine in Spain, to Louis Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain, 8 August 1705, in Walker, *Spanish Politics*, 23. Later, in 1754, Irishman John Boyle wrote in reference to the court at Parma, “The French hate the Spaniards, the Spaniards hate the French, and the Italians hate them both.” One might say that his words resonated beyond Italy earlier in the century, as well. John Boyle, 5th Earl of Cork and Orrery, “Letter VI from Bologna, Oct. 24, 1754,” *Letters from Italy in the years 1754 and 1755, by the late Right Honourable John Earl of Corke and Orrery*, ed. John Duncombe (London: B. White, 1773), 60.

45. Antonio García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlantico (1717–1778): El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano* (Sevilla: Imprenta C.S.I.C., 1976), 122. By the eighteenth century, foreign merchants were allowed to settle in Cádiz and trade with a license. See also: Margarita García-Mauriño Mundi, *La pugna entre el Consulado de Cádiz y los jenízaros por las exportaciones a Indias, 1720–1765* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1999).

46. García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlántico*, 122–23. It was on 25 May 1720 that the ill-fated vessel, the *Grand Saint-Antoine*, arrived in Marseille carrying people and cargo infected with plague.

47. In “Señor mio, si al Amo le llegaron quejas deste Consul de Francia. . . .” (1720), Barcelona, Estado 506, Archivo Historico Nacional de España [henceforth cited as AHN]. This same document provides one of the many accounts that emerge at this time of French merchandise being burned in the ports. It should also be mentioned that the port city of Barcelona served as the commercial capital of Catalonia, especially between 1720 and 1770, partly as a result of Bourbon centralization. Consequently, it was a major Spanish port for trade with the Levant, and thus Marseille, over the eighteenth century. See Eloy Martín Corrales, *Comercio de Cataluña con el Mediterráneo musulmán, siglos XVI–XVIII: El comercio con los “enemigos de la fe”* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2001), 154–63.

48. In August 1720, for example, Pierre-Nicolas Partyet composed his “Memoire for the gentlemen of the Marine Council, to demonstrate that the Frenchmen who come and stay in Spain to conduct trade are not treated as favorably as they would have reason to hope if the treaties concluded between the two Crowns were faithfully executed.” Pierre-Nicolas Partyet to Conseil de Marine, “Mémoire à nosseigneurs du Conseil de Marine pour faire voir que les François qui viennent et demeurent en Espagne à l’occasion de leur commerce n’y sont pas traités aussy favorablement qu’ils auroient lieu de l’espérer si les traités passés entre les deux couronnes y estoient fidèlement executes,” 7 August 1720, AE, 225, ff. 214–30v, AN.

49. The parlement of Aix issued an *arrêt* (decree) on 31 July 1720 to stop all communication with Marseille, prohibiting the movement of any more people out of the city. It was not until 12 August 1720 that the Regent sent three medical practitioners from Montpellier, doctors François Chicoyneau and François Verny and surgeon Jean Soulier (or Soullier), to investigate the epidemic that by then was killing as many as four hundred people per day.

50. The *Real y Supremo Consejo de Castilla* was the Spanish monarch’s executive council.

51. José Luis Fresquet Febrer, “Los medicos frente a la enfermedad en la Valencia del siglo XVIII,” in *Estudios sobre la profesión médica en la sociedad valenciana, 1329–1898*, ed. José María López Piñero (Valencia: Ajuntament de València, 1998), 276. Excluded from these restrictions was the main port of Genoa itself because “that port alone has secured itself” against the infection.

52. After the War of the Quadruple Alliance in 1720, Victor Amadeus II was obliged to give up Sicily in exchange for the Kingdom of Sardinia.

53. In January 1727, for example, Spain would declare the sections on Gibraltar in the Treaty of Utrecht null and void, claiming that the British violated its terms by failing to protect Catholics by allowing Jews and Moors to live there, extending fortifications beyond allowable limits, and allowing smuggling that hurt Spanish profits. In February Spain began a siege that lasted until June, and the Utrecht terms that granted Gibraltar to the British were confirmed again in the 1729 Treaty of Seville. These disputes effectively led to the construction of the *Línea de Contravalación*, or Spanish Lines. Conflict over Gibraltar very much continues to this day.

54. Harrison, *Contagion*, 32, 31.

55. “Lisboa, 9 Jan. 1721,” *Gaceta de Madrid*, no. 4, 28 January 1721, 16. These regulations had actually begun earlier, on 20 September 1720, when Portugal resolved to prohibit all trade from France. “Lisbon,” *Post Boy* (London), 23 September 1720.

56. Mariano Peset, Pilar Mancebo, and José L. Peset, “Temores y defensa de España frente a la peste de Marsella de 1720,” *Asclepio: Archivo Iberoamericano de Historia de la Medicina y Antropología Médica* 23 (1971): 145. News made it to King Philip through communications from his authorities in Navarre, Perpignan, and Aragon. See Peset and Peset, *Muerte en España*, 30.

57. “Señor mio, si al Amo le llegaron quejas deste Consul de Francia. . . .” Barcelona, Estado 506, AHN. Though the letter is not dated or signed, it appears to be from Don Francisco de Quesada to Marqués de Grimaldo. See also: Don Francisco de Quesada to Marqués de Grimaldo, Barcelona, 7 December 1720, Estado 506, AHN.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Consejos 1476, 2 October 1720, f. 133v–134, AHN; Consejos 1476, 29 August 1720, f. 129v, AHN. See also Fernando Varela Peris, “El papel de la Junta Suprema de Sanidad en la política sanitaria Española del siglo XVIII,” *Dynamis: Acta Hispanica ad Medicinae Scientiarumque Historiam Illustrandam* 18 (1998): 315–40, 317; Josep Barona and Josep Bernabeu-Mestre, *La salud y el Estado: El movimiento sanitario internacional y la administración española, 1851–1945* (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2008), 15.

60. *Cavildos del año de 1720*, libro no. 76, f. 398, AC, AMC. See also Peset, Mancebo, and Peset, “Temores y Defensa,” 149. Peset and Mancebo, “Valencia y la peste de Marsella,” 567–68.

61. Virginia León Sanz, “Felipe V y la sociedad catalana al finalizar la guerra de sucesión,” *Pedralbes: Revista d’història moderna* 23 (2003): 271.

62. *Ibid.*

63. For continuity in health regulations in Barcelona, see, for example: Alfonso Zarzoso, “Protomedicato y boticarios en la Barcelona del siglo XVIII,” *Dynamis: Acta Hispanica ad Medicinae Scientiarumque Historiam Illustrandam* 16 (1996): 151–71.

64. Ricardo García Cárcel, “La opinión de los españoles sobre Felipe V después de la Guerra de Sucesión,” *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna Anejos* 1 (2002): 113.

65. Peset, Mancebo, and Peset, “Temores y defensa,” 149.

66. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, comte de Maurepas, secrétaire d’État de la Marine, Cádiz, 23 November 1727, ff. 192–95v, AE, BI, 233, AN. This is one of the documents that mentions that commercial relations did not resume until March 1724. Also see Peset, Mancebo, and Peset, “Temores y defensa,” 187; and Rambert, “La France et la politique commerciale,” 274.

67. Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, “El resguardo de la salud: Organización sanitaria española en el siglo XVIII,” *Dynamis: Acta Hispanica ad Medicinae Scientiarumque Historiam Illustrandam* 7–8 (1987–88): 147; Zarzoso, “¿Obligación moral o responsabilidad política?,” 85. Santiago Muñoz Machado, *La sanidad pública en España: Evolución histórica y situación actual* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1975), 82. The *Junta* was formed by Mirabal and his councilors, Jose de Castro, Pedro Jose de Grava (elsewhere spelled Lagrava), Francisco Ameller, and Luis Curriel (sometimes spelled Curriel). See also: Febrer, “Los medicos,” 276.

68. Peio J. Monteano, *Ira de Dios: Los Navarros en la era de la peste, 1348–1723* (Pamplona: Gráfica Ona, 2002), 238; Varela Peris, “El papel de la Junta Suprema de Sanidad,” 317–18.

69. Increasingly, it took over various aspects of local decision making about matters of health. Perdigüero Gil, “Con medios humanos y divinos,” 145–46. Peset and Peset, *Muerte en España*, 33.

70. José Javier Viñes Rueda, *La Sanidad española en el siglo XIX* (Navarre: Departamento de Salud, 2006): 38–68, 44. Years after the threat of plague had subsided, the *Junta* saw an interruption in August 1742 when it was temporarily abolished. However, this was not to last, and it was reinstated in July 1743 partly as a result of an outbreak of plague in northern Africa, but also because it was deemed better to have a mostly inactive Board of Health than to dismantle it and have to quickly recreate one should another outbreak take place. Indeed, Spain was to become increasingly acquainted with outbreaks of yellow fever into the nineteenth century—outbreaks that once again kept authorities busy for some time. The *Junta* was eventually replaced in part by the *Dirección General de Sanidad* under the *Ministerio de la Gobernación* that was formed with the Cortes de Cádiz (the ministerio lasted until 1977), and by the *Real Consejo de Sanidad* in December 1855. See: Joaquín del Moral Ruiz, Juan Pro Ruiz, and Fernando Suárez Bilbao, *Estado y territorio en España, 1820–1930: La formación del paisaje nacional* (Madrid: Libros de la Catarata, 2007), 226; Muñoz Machado, *La sanidad pública*, 83; Ocaña, “El resguardo de la salud,” 150.

71. Peset, Mancebo, and Peset, “Temores y defensa,” 154.

72. “Señor, El valle de Roncal del Reyno de Navarra siempre fidelissimo a VM y siempre confiado de sus augustas,” Consejos 10145, AHN. This letter is only one of many, mostly from the eastern regions of the Iberian Peninsula, requesting that exceptions to the new regulations be made, lest the people suffer from lack of industry.

73. “Génova, 22 Oct. 1720,” *Gaceta de Madrid*, no. 48, 26 November 1720, 190.

74. Officials in the city of Murcia feared that the city lay vulnerable to possible infection since it was situated near the coast and had no protective wall to speak of. As a result, they found it necessary to enclose the city with mud walls, leaving only enough doors to handle traffic, each of which would be guarded as had been done in Valencia and Aragon. Antonio Peñafiel Ramón and Concepción Peñafiel Ramón, "Repercusión de la epidemia de peste marsellesa de 1720 en la ciudad de Murcia: Realidad de un gran miedo," *Contrastes: Revista de Historia Moderna* 3–4 (1987–88): 63; 18 September 1720, ff. 139–40, AC 338, AMU.
75. Ramón and Ramón, "Repercusión," 65.
76. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet, *Mémoire pour le fondeo*, 18 November 1731, MAR, B7, 310, no. 26, AN.
77. "Mémoire sur la visite appelée fondeo," 18 May 1734, AE, BIII, 361, no. 9, AN. See Jean O. McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750: A Study of the Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 192.
78. José Canga Argüelles, *Diccionario de hacienda con aplicación a España, Tomo 2* (Madrid: Imprenta de Don Marcelino Calero y Portocarrero, 1834), 497–98.
79. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 29 November 1728, AE, BI, 235, ff. 192–92v, AN.
80. June 1749, AE, BIII, 361, AN.
81. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 17 August 1728, AE, BI, 235, ff. 88–89v, AN; 23 May 1730, AE, BI, 238, ff. 185–91v, AN; Louis de Lastre, chancelier du consulat de France à Cadix, to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 14 February 1730, AE, BI, 238, ff. 43–45v, AN. For another important document on French perceptions of the *fondeo*, see "Mémoire sur la visite appelée fondeo," 18 May 1734, AE, BIII, 361, no. 9, AN.
82. Pierre-Nicolas Partyet to Conseil de Marine, 23 December 1720, AE, BI, 225, ff. 361v–362, AN.
83. "Mémoire sur la question d'establier une chambre pour diriger le commerce d'Espagne al'instar de la chambre de Marseille pour le commerce de Levant," August 1731, MAR, B7, 310, AN.
84. It was not only the French who complained about the searches. Since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, despite an increase in French activity in the *Carrera de Indias* prior to 1720, French complaints often claimed that the British and their allies were reaping all the advantages of French suffering in the Spanish market, due in part to the privileges that were transferred from France to England in the Treaty of Utrecht (most notably, the *asiento de negros*). These complaints increased exponentially after 1720, but in reality, the English, too, suffered injustices in Spanish ports. See, for instance: Lord Stanhope to Marquis de Grimaldo, Madrid, 9 May 1722, Consejos 10145, AHN; Pierre-Nicolas Partyet to Conseil de Marine, Cádiz, 27 November 1718, AE, BI, 224, ff. 454–55, AN.
85. Pierre-Nicolas Partyet to Conseil de Marine, Cádiz, 30 June 1721, AE, BI, 226, ff. 147–48v, AN.
86. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 18 July 1730, AE, BI, 239, ff. 31–36, AN.
87. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet, *Mémoire pour le fondeo*, 18 November 1731, MAR, B7, 310, no. 2, AN.
88. Patiño held many important positions in the first decades of the eighteenth century and is often considered Spain's first prime minister.
89. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 18 July 1730, AE, BI, 239, f. 33v, AN.
90. Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux in Compiègne to Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet in Cádiz, 12 August 1730, AE, BI, 239, f. 75, AN.

91. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 8 August 1730, AE, BI, 239, ff. 70–73v, AN.
92. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 15 August 1730, AE, BI, 239, ff. 78–80v, AN.
93. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 27 September 1730, AE, BI, 239, ff. 134–37v, AN. Jean-Baptiste Martin Partyet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 21 November 1730, AE, BI, 239, ff. 268–73v, AN. This was, in fact, the first of many outbreaks of yellow fever in the port of Cádiz.
94. “Mémoire sur la visite appellée fondeo,” 18 May 1734, AE, BIII, 361, no. 9, AN.
95. Paul Caultet, chancelier du consulat de France à Cadix to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 16 August 1735, AE, BI, 246, ff. 177–81v, AN; Caultet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 23 August 1735, AE, BI, 246, ff. 182–85v, AN; Caultet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 30 August 1735, AE, BI, 246, ff. 186–89v, AN; Caultet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 12 September 1735, AE, BI, 246, ff. 192–95v, AN.
96. Caultet to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 18 November 1735, AE, BI, 246, ff. 248–51v, AN; Jean Baptiste Martin Partyet, consul de France à Cadix to Jean Frédéric Phélypeaux, 6 December 1735, AE, BI, 246, ff. 258–62v, AN.
97. For example, see Comisión de Salud Pública, *Proyecto de ley orgánica de sanidad pública de la Monarquía Española* (Madrid: Imprenta de Alban y Compañía, 1822), 149–50.
98. Harrison, *Contagion*, 37, 25.
99. “Paris, 15 February 1723,” *Gaceta de Madrid*, no. 9, 2 March 1723, 34–35.
100. “Génova, 7 May 1723,” *Gaceta de Madrid*, no. 22, 1 June 1723, 86.
101. For more on this outbreak, see José Luis Betrán Moya, “Sociedad y peste en la Barcelona de 1651,” *Manuscrits: Revista d’història moderna* 8 (January 1990): 255–82. And for a study on the measures taken in Madrid to protect itself (not the rest of the realm) from the plague while it raged in Valencia, see: Elvira Arquiola, Jose Luis Peset, Mariano Peset, and Santiago La Parra, “Madrid, villa y corte, ante la peste de Valencia de 1647–1648,” *Estudis: Revista de historia moderna* 5 (1976): 29–46.
102. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *La Sociedad Española en el Siglo XVII: El Estamento nobiliario*, vol. 1 (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1992), 71.
103. *Ibid.*
104. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Historia de Sevilla: La Sevilla del siglo XVII* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla Secretariado de Publicaciones, 1986), 74. Other estimates claim that a quarter of the city’s population perished. Either way, those who died made up a sizable percentage of the population.
105. Juan Ignacio Carmona García, *La Peste en Sevilla* (Sevilla: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2005), 224.
106. James Casey, *España en la Edad Moderna: Una historia social* (Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2001), 76–77.
107. José Luis Betrán Moya, *La peste en la Barcelona de los Austrias* (Lleida: Editorial Milenio, 1996), 259.
108. Betrán Moya, “Sociedad y peste,” 270–73.
109. The Great Plague of London raged through September 1666 and took an estimated 100,000 lives. Still, by October 1667, commercial restrictions had been lifted. Monteano, *Ira de Dios*, 226–27.
110. Hildesheimer, *Le Bureau de la santé*, 155–56.
111. Kevin Fox Gotham, “Disaster, Inc.: Privatization and Post-Katrina Rebuilding in New Orleans,” *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 3 (September 2012): 642.
112. Beginning with one José Fornés, for example, a Spanish physician sent to Marseille to confirm the presence of plague, “inspectors” were designated at the beginning of each major outbreak of disease, assigned with the task of investigating the epidemic and reporting back to Madrid—a tradition that was also to continue into the nineteenth century.

113. It is important to highlight the use of the word “pretext” in the archival record. Its use throughout this study is deliberate. The word is ubiquitous in contemporary French correspondence that discusses the commercially restrictive policies set in place by the Spanish Crown. It was meant to accuse Spain of imposing certain regulations to enhance its own position in international commerce at the expense of its strongest and most intimate competitor. Indeed, such French suspicion and distrust was founded in reality. To be clear, I do not mean to imply that some plague-time policies were not also meant to serve as actual precautions against the plague. The fear of the spread of contagion was very real and intensely felt in many parts of Europe, and measures were put in place all over the continent and its colonies to prevent the spread of infection. Nowhere else, however, were measures as stringent, or as enduring as they were in Spain, where the first Bourbon monarch was struggling to correct some of the many perceived ills that had plagued Spain since the seventeenth century under the later Habsburgs.

114. See, for example, Elinor Accampo and Jeffrey H. Jackson, “Introduction,” *French Historical Studies* 36, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 165–74; Jonathan Bergman, “Disaster: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis,” *History Compass* 6, no. 3 (2008): 934–46; Charles F. Walker, *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2008); Matthew Mulcahy, *Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624–1783* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2008); Ted Steinberg, *Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000); Alan Taylor, “The Hungry Year: 1789 on the Northern Border of Revolutionary America,” in *Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Alessa Johns (New York: Routledge, 1999), 145–82; Stephen Tobriner, “Safety and Reconstruction of Noto after the Sicilian Earthquake of 1683: The 18th-Century Context,” in *Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Alessa Johns (New York: Routledge, 1999), 49–80; John C. Burnham, “A Neglected Field: The History of Natural Disasters,” *AHA Newsletter* 26, no. 4 (April 1988): 22–24.